The Village Read online
Praise for Bing West’s gripping war narrative
THE VILLAGE
“Unquestionably the best book to come out of the Vietnam war—human, compassionate, suspenseful, dramatic.”
—Charles B. MacDonald,
author of Company Commander
“A superbly honest, readable work that goes beyond journalism to become good literature.”
—Peter Braestrup, author of Tet
“This is the way Vietnam should have been fought—by tough volunteers who lived alongside the Vietnamese…. It will take the sternest idealogue to remain unmoved by West’s perceptive and human treatment of the men who fought it…. It’s an account of brave men at war in a far country, honestly told.”
—Washington Post Book Review
“One of the small handful of truly great books to come out of the Vietnam war.”
—Keith William Nolan, author of
The Battle for Saigon and A Hundred Miles of Bad Road
“Pure Hemingway in the best sense of that characterization…. West brilliantly portrays the drama of a war few Americans have known.”
—Pacific Affairs
“Professional reading for professional growth.”
—Commandant’s Reading List
“A fantastic, down in the mud and crud book of enlisted Marines fighting to defend a village…. West tells of some of the victories and the tragic cost. And he tells it well.”
—Leatherneck Magazine
Books by Bing West
The Pepperdogs
Small Unit Action in Vietnam
Naval Forces and National Security: Sea Plan 2000
POCKET BOOKS, a division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020
Copyright © 1972 by F. J. West, Jr.
Copyright renewed © 2000 by F. J. West, Jr.
Epilogue copyright © 2003 by F. J. West, Jr.
All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any form whatsoever. For information address Pocket Books, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020
ISBN-13: 978-0-7434-7881-6
ISBN-10: 0-7434-7881-9
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To Mrs. Brannon,
and to the other mothers,
in order that they may better understand
what their sons did
Contents
Foreword by James R. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense
Author’s Preface
Book I The Setting
Book II Night Patrols
Book III Defeat
Book IV “Work Very Hard—Never Look Tired”
Book V The Challenge
Book VI Acceptance
Epilogue:1967
1968
1969–70
1971
2002
Simon & Schuster Proudly Presents The Pepperdogs
Photos
Foreword
by Former Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger
It is now some eighteen years since a young, ex–Marine captain joined us at the RAND Corporation. I for one found his writing absorbing. It was different from the torrent of Vietnam analysis in two respects. First, it was descriptive and concrete—simple vignettes that hinted at, but did not state, larger conclusions. The writing was sparse: stripped of those grandiose strategies or clichés (it is sometimes difficult to identify which is which) that frequently pass for wisdom at higher levels of government. West left the theorizing about grand strategy to others; not for him that American proclivity to impose the big picture from above. Second, his prose had a haunting quality—noticeably different from the rather sterile bureaucratese one so frequently encountered in RAND memoranda.
The splendid thing about this volume is its lack of pretense. West provides a remarkable portrait of the ethos of the Vietnamese countryside and a sense of what life in conditions of war was really like. Binh Nghia is a microcosm—with the generalized and parochial distrust of all outside forces characteristic of such a village. Since the war raging about the village was primarily a civil war, certain rules of the game to limit damage or reprisal against family and bystanders were unavoidable. The famous “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese villagers could scarcely be won unless the government could provide security. Therein lay the crux of the pacification program. The village war would determine the outcome of the civil war. The ultimate failure of the Viet Cong in the village war meant that Hanoi could only triumph through direct invasion: the eighteen line divisions of the North Vietnamese Army that finally crushed the GVN in the spring of 1975.
The American attempt to shore up South Vietnam led to divisions in this country of a type that we had not seen in this century. Other wars—the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War—had caused domestic divisions. But none had dragged on for a decade, and so those earlier tensions had been more rapidly dispelled. For the nation, Vietnam did not provide the unifying and exhilarating affect of World War II. Returning veterans were staggered, quite understandably, to discover that, having served God and Country, they were not received on their return with the usual acclaim. Protests about the war spawned ideologies, rather narrow minded ideologies at that. Put briefly, everything about Vietnam had to be rejected. The result was a shunning of this excellent book. Fashionable journals declined to review it.
I can well recall at the time West’s disappointment at this rather unfair treatment. His work was largely descriptive and certainly nonideological, but it had been swept up in the larger ideological passions. Yet, as the bitterness of that earlier debate fades, this little study has finally come into its own. I can recall telling West in the early 1970s: do not worry; this is the classic description of the war; your book will eventually receive its just due—a decade from now, indeed half a century from now, those interested in the war will be reading your book to discover what it was really like. I believe that experience has justified that prophecy.
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
JANUARY 1985
Dr. Schlesinger was Secretary of Defense in 1975, when South Vietnam fell. Prior to that, he was Director of Central Intelligence.
Author’s Preface
This is the story of fifteen Marines who lived and fought for two years inside a Vietnamese village. There was shooting almost every night; from across the river a seasoned Viet Cong battalion attacked repeatedly. In this village, the South Vietnamese farmers planted rice during the day and after dusk patrolled with the Marines.
When this book was first published, emotions over America’s role in Vietnam were heated and some critics refused to review The Village. Others wrote that Marines could not have lived for years protecting villagers from the Viet Cong and from the North Vietnamese. Yet despite the skeptics, at the height of the Vietnam War a dozen U.S. Marines did live in the village and were generally accepted by 6,000 Vietnamese farmers.
This is the story of one squad of Marines who spent over two years in the village of Binh Nghia (BEEN-KNEE-AH) and experienced some of the most intense and sustained small unit fighting throughout Vietnam. Reasonably, the Marines were too far outnumbered to survive and push out the guerrillas. The squad, despite its losses, never believed that. To stay alive, they used the tactics of the guerrillas.
To understand the reasons for the continuous combat and to decide whether to leave a Marine squad alone in such a village, the Marine command had sent me—an infantry captain—into The Village in 1966, although a squad ordinarily was led by a sergeant. While I led many of the patrols described in detail in the book, this story belongs to the men of
the squad. So in writing the story I functioned simply as an unnamed character and also as the camera’s eye. I tried to describe how we fought—not why—and I let the descriptions stand alone, without editorializing about the emotions and the hardships.
The Village is a description, as best as I could relate as a participant, of what war is like when you fight guerrillas, and of how Americans behaved when they volunteered to fight among the people. It was a bloody and intensely personal war. The Marines fought well while they were there; the village remained intact, out of bounds both to American air and artillery strikes and to North Vietnamese force and rule.
When I returned to The Village in 2002 (see the last chapter), I was greeted warmly by those who had fought on both sides. The marker to the Marines who had fallen was still there. Sometimes we underestimate how others see us.
BING WEST
SEPTEMBER 2002
To my wife, Kate, special thanks are due for shielding me from the household tasks I properly should have been doing when I was writing and for encouraging me to write on the many weekends when we both would have preferred doing something—anything—else.
Book I
The Setting
1
Ap Thanh Lam wanted to go home. In the last six years of fighting, he had stayed overnight in his home village only once. And that night he had hidden in the shadows of a thicket and left as soon as he had killed his man.
Lam was a policeman—a professional who shunned politics and avoided discussions about ideology. He owed his training to the Viet Minh, in whose Security Service he had worked after World War II. He had broken with the Communists in 1954, and subsequently had fought against them. The Saigon government, though glad of his services, held him suspect, refused him promotions and transferred him frequently. But Lam was given what he valued most: freedom to operate as he chose. A middle-aged man with an unmistakable air of authority, Lam looked and acted like a cop. Even in friendly conversation he gave the impression that part of him was holding back, watching, listening, judging, respected by the villagers because he did not tax them and hated by the Viet Cong because he could trap them.
Lam rarely accompanied the Army into Viet Cong hamlets. Instead, he let the Viet Cong come to him. When he had a tip that a VC leader might be visiting a government-controlled hamlet, he told no one. That way, there was no chance of a leak. Even his squad of special police frequently did not know where or why he was taking them. The trapped Viet Cong rarely fought. The surprise was too great. A door would suddenly be kicked open and there would stand Lam, backed up by a dozen police with submachine guns.
In May of 1966, Lam was told that Truong My, an important VC cadre, would be sleeping with his wife on a certain night in the VC village of Binh Nghia (pronounced “Been Knee-ah”). Ordinarily, Lam would not have acted on that information. Trying to slip undetected into a VC hamlet was too dangerous. Most likely his police would be spotted by the hamlet sentries and end up in a firefight with the local guerrilla platoon while the VC leader escaped.
But Binh Nghia was different. It was Lam’s home. He knew the back paths and hedgerows, the gates and the gaps in the fences, the backyard runs of the children and the houses of VC families.
The evening Truong My was due home, Lam put on the black pajamas and conical hat of a farmer and stuck a snub-nosed .38 revolver in his waistband. Unaccompanied, he left district headquarters and padded barefoot to the bank of a nearby river, where he climbed into a small sampan.
It was dusk when Lam reached the village. The VC sentries saw his sampan turn into the bank, but before they could walk to it, Lam had ducked into a nearby thicket. The sentries walked back to their outpost position without raising the alarm, having assumed Lam was a farmer returning late from the district market.
Lam stayed crouched in the thicket for several hours, patiently waiting for the families to finish their dinners, for the children to go to bed, for the dogs to curl up under the houses, for the women to wash the dishes, for the men to finish their strong moonshine wine, for the lights to go out. The Viet Cong did not mount strong patrols inside their hamlets at night; instead, they guarded its perimeters. By midnight Lam was walking slowly through the backyards with no worry about an ambush and with only mild concern that he might accidentally bump into some VC on the move.
The home of Truong My was near the house in which Lam had been born and where his mother still lived. Lam and Truong My knew each other, but not well, for Lam was ten or fifteen years older. Although since choosing sides neither man dared visit his home on a regular basis, their families were immune from the violence. The relatives and children of both sides were equally vulnerable to reprisals, so no man dared strike the family of another, lest his own family suffer ten times over.
At one in the morning, Lam passed by his mother’s house. Its lights were out, but lanterns were still flickering in a few other houses and it was toward one of them that Lam carefully walked. When near the hedge which surrounded the house, he stopped and stood for several minutes in the darkness, listening to the low drone of conversation from within the house and watching for any movement outside in case Truong My had brought a bodyguard home with him.
Once satisfied that Truong My and his wife were alone, Lam moved rapidly. Revolver in hand, he walked up to the gate in the hedge and felt along its hinges for any booby traps. Finding no trip wires, he untied the rope latch, opened the gate and entered the front yard. Without pausing, he proceeded across the porch and kicked open the front door.
Truong My was sitting at a table in the center of the room, a small cup of tea in front of him. His wife was off in a corner, tending the hearth. The wife was startled. Truong My was not. In the second during which the door had come banging open, the Viet Cong leader knew what would be next. It took Lam only an instant to cross the threshold and level his pistol. But in that same time Truong My had come to his feet, kicking his stool behind him and thrusting the table toward Lam.
Then the first bullet hit him, but it didn’t stop him, and he had momentum, and he was close to the doorway leading to the back of the house. But Lam was firing again, and again, and Truong My never reached the doorway. He died in his home while his wife watched.
Lam was not through. He ran to the house next door. There he found a farmer and his wife, who had heard the shooting, shepherding their sleepy children toward the family bomb shelter. At gunpoint, he led the parents back to Truong My’s house, where he forced them to pick up the body and follow him at a fast shuffle to the river bank. With his dead enemy draped over the bow, he was paddling down-river toward the district town before the Viet Cong guerrillas in the village of Binh Nghia could organize a search for him.
The corpse lay on display in the district market all day, an object lesson intended to lessen the prestige of the Viet Cong and to demonstrate the power of the government forces. For a week afterward, the district buzzed with the news of Lam’s exploit. The Viet Cong district committee swore they would revenge the killing of Truong My, their fury adding to Lam’s reputation.
In June, Lam again moved in a spectacular way. He had been closely watching one of the leaders of a local political party. The man had been busy haranguing crowds and organizing support for a Buddhist struggle movement against the Saigon government. Acting on an informer’s advice, Lam had the man seized at his home, where a quick search revealed correspondence which identified the prisoner as a member of the Viet Cong Current Affairs Committee. Yet the prisoner spent less than a day in jail before his political friends convinced the district chief it would be unwise to press charges.
There the matter did not end. To teach Lam not to act so independently, the political party started a whispering campaign against him, alleging that he was in the secret employ of Premier Ky and the Saigon clique. These were serious charges, for the Saigon government was never popular in Lam’s province, and if Lam was considered a spy for the Ky regime, many of his sources of information would dry up.
Lam’s temper was quick, and when he heard what the local political party was rumoring about him, he barged into the district chief’s office and laid down an ultimatum.
“Do you know what is being said about me?” he yelled. “That I work for Ky—that I am not loyal to my province. Those idiots out there would rather see the Viet Cong take this province than work together. They won’t believe what their eyes tell them. Well, I’m not going to put up with it. Either you get them to shut up or I’m going to arrest the next politician who hints that I’m getting paid to spy for Saigon. And if the arrest won’t stick, I’ll cut his tongue out before I let him go.”
“You can’t,” the district chief replied. “And I can’t. Neither of us is powerful enough. Let it die down. It might be better if you worked somewhere else for a while.”
“Like where?”
“How would you like to go home to Binh Nghia? Your mother would be glad to see you. I gather you didn’t stop by to say hello when you went in after Truong My.”
“What are you driving at?” Lam asked. “You know I wouldn’t last half an hour in the village without troops. And you don’t have troops good enough to clear that village.”
“I may have,” the district chief replied. “Younger Brother thinks he can get some American Marines. The Americans don’t like Viet Cong in the village right at the end of their airfield. They will help us if we send in some police and organize a militia. If you want, you can be in charge. It’s up to you. It’s your village.”
Major Richard Braun was called Younger Brother by the district chief whom he advised. Although an affectionate term, it signified that the adviser was in the position of learning, not teaching. Braun didn’t mind, since he had no intention of meddling in the Byzantine politics of the Vietnamese. Instead, he took pride in his thorough knowledge of infantry tactics. Every outpost in his district was registered to receive illumination and artillery support. He knew whom to call for night medevacs. He kept close liaison with the neighboring American units.